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Japan and the International Monetary Regime 
Koichi Hamada and Hugh T. Patrick 
The international monetary regime, the set of rules that governs the 
monetary mechanism of international trade and investment, is one of the 
foundations of the world economy. The development of every national 
economy is conditioned by the way the international monetary regime is 
arranged, and every major economy has contributed, though with different 
degrees of importance, to its evolution. The Japanese economy is no 
exception. This paper reviews the postwar development of the interna-
tional monetary regime involving Japan and Japan's growing involvement, 
evaluates the efficacy and viability of the current flexible exchange 
rate regimes, and speculate on the possibility of the future reform of 
the international monetary regime as viewed across the Pacific. 
The. United States played the dominant role in the postwar evolution 
of the international monetary regime. In the Bretton Woods system, 
particularly in its practice, the United States was such an important 
leader that before Nixon's New Economic Policy in 1971 the Bretton Woods 
system was called the "dollar standard." However weak it was, the link 
between the value of currencies and gold remained a link, between the 
dollar and gold. The dollar was the major, if not the only, vehicle 
currency. This U.S. leadership role declined after the breakdown in 
1971-73 of the Bretton Woods regime, that is, the old IMF regime. 
European countries have come to play an increasingly important role, and 
We are indebted to Akiyoshi Horiuchi for valuable comments, and to 
Jamie Lipson and Frances Rosenbluth for their editorial and research 
assistance. 
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in the past decade Japan has played a relatively significant role. The 
United States, however, continues to be the leader in the sense that 
changes in rules cannot occur without its cooperation. The best example 
of this is the intervention after September 1985 of the Group of Five 
(the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Japan), 
which was organized under the leadership of the United States and re-
flected a major shift from the earlier policy of nonintervention in 
currency markets. 
The United States has also been an important actor over the past 
several years in a different respect. The dollar was overvalued for 
several years (from 1981 to at least the mid-1986), in terms of trade 
flows and of the structure of the U.S. economy, largely because of the 
domestic macroeconomic policy of a highly expansionary fiscal policy 
combined with a restrictive monetary policy, which led to high real and 
nominal interest rates. Excessive spending in relation to production 
(typically stated in macro-terms as more investment than saving but more 
precisely a reflection of the immense and rising federal budget deficits) 
created high interest rates and a huge and growing current-account 
deficit that had to be financed by huge capital inflows. This caused 
serious concern in many parts of the world. The United States is still 
special in the world economy because of its leadership role, because of 
its huge size, and because, unlike every other country, foreigners were 
and are still willing to hold large amounts of their wealth in 
dollar-denominated financial claims, even though they assume substantial 
foreign exchange risks in the process. 
For its part, Japan was a negligible player and passive accepter of 
the international monetary system in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, in the 
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early 1970s, Japan emerged as a country with some destabilizing impact on 
the system and even as a catalyst for change. In the 1980s, Japan has 
become one of the major actors in the system, given its immense financial 
involvement in the rest of the world and burgeoning current-account 
surpluses and concomitant net capital outflows. Joint intervention to 
affect the value of the dollar (particularly vis-a-vis the yen) now 
requires the support of the Japanese monetary authorities as well as the 
U.S. authorities. 
In 1949, during the occupation* Japan fixed its exchange rate at $1 
= ¥360. Under the old IMF adjustable-peg system (the Bretton Woods 
regime), Japan adhered strictly to this exchange rate until 1971, when 
President Nixon announced the New Economic Policy that cut the already 
weakening link between the dollar and gold completely. In addition, for 
the Japanese economy, which relies almost completely on foreign energy 
sources, the formation of 0PEC!s petroleum cartel was a heavy blow. The 
Japanese economy coped with these environmental changes by energy saving 
programs and big contractionary macroeconomic policies, although at the 
cost of a substantial slowdown in output growth since the mid-1970s in 
comparison with the superfast growth of the 1950s and 1960s. These 
relatively successful adjustment processes were accomplished under the 
flexible exchange-rate regime. Now Japan, like many other nations, seeks 
a better international monetary regime though that will be difficult to 
devise. 
The general attitude of the Japanese government as well as the 
Japanese public toward the international monetary regime has been rather 
passive. After the wartime destruction, the Japanese economy occupied 
only a tiny place in the world. It was generally conceived of as an 
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economy closely associated with, and often subordinate to, the U.S. 
economy. The favorite phrase was When the United States sneezes, Japan 
catches pneumonia. Japan was completely under U.S. hegemony in the 
economic as well as the political sense. 
During the period of rapid economic growth in the 1960s, the rela-
tive importance of the Japanese economy increase substantially, though 
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the Japanese public still perceived of it as lagging behind. However, 
Japanfs sudden and large balance of payments current-account surplus and 
the reluctance of the Japanese government to revalue the yen were among 
the main factors that triggered Nixon?s drastic adoption of the New 
Economic Policy. Because of its increased role in the world economy, 
Japan functioned as a. pivotal element in this critical change in the 
international monetary regime. 
In this sense, not only has Japanese economic development been 
supported by the international superstructure or overhead capital (name-
ly, the international monetary regime), but the growing presence of Japan 
has influenced the evolution of the international monetary regime. This 
observation is reinforced by the effect of the Group of Five!s interven-
tions in September 1985, whose impact on exchange rates, particularly 
that of the yen, was much greater than anticipated. Subsequently, the 
Japanese began to recognize the extent of the repercussions of their own 
domestic policy making on the world economy. 
Koichi Hamada, f!The Communication Problem of Nouveau Riche,ft 
The World Economy, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1978), pp. 407-418. 
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The methodology utilized in this paper is an extension of the 
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political-economy approach of Hamada, First, we specify the 
cost-benefit structure that an international monetary regime brings to 
participating countries and explore the questions What kind of interna-
tional monetary regime do participating countries desire, and what kind 
of international monetary regime is likely to be realized, given the 
potential cost-benefit structures implied by various regimes. An inter-
national monetary regime, and more generally any international regime, 
can be regarded as a public good* The main goal of this approach is to 
study how to create the mechanism for providing an international monetary 
regime with proper incentives for participating countries. 
In the first section, we briefly describe the development of the 
postwar international monetary regime. We discuss why the adjustable-peg 
system collapsed, and how it affected the development of the Japanese 
economy. Then? we describe how the flexible exchange-rate regime among 
major industrial countries has worked in the past decade and how Japanese 
monetary authorities conducted their intervention (or occasionally 
nonintervention) policy in the exchange market. 
In the second section, we provide a general assessment of the 
ongoing flexible exchange-rate system. Much can be said in favor of the 
partly managed flexible exchange-rate system. Unlike the adjustable-peg 
system, the system has not led to many crises in foreign exchange mar-
kets, Pressures in foreign exchange markets have not resulted in in-
creasing controls on capital flows or on trade flows, as was often the 
See Koichi Hamada, The Political Economy of International Monetary 
Interdependence, MIT Press 1985. 
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case under the old IMF regime. Accordingly, the system has supported a 
relatively open international trade system as well as an international 
financial system. Thus, the current system may be judged as satisfying 
the minimum requirement for an appropriate international monetary regime. 
However, movements in real and nominal exchange rates have been highly 
volatile, and some economists point out the possibility of misalignment 
from reasonably defined equilibrium exchange rates. They suspect that 
the degree of observed volatility may be greater than that required to 
accommodate smooth resource allocations through trade and capital move-
ments. Moreover, misalignment and the huge trade deficit have resulted 
in substantially increased protectionist pressures in the United States. 
Determining the actual situations -- whether and how much the market 
exchange rate have been misaligned — is however, difficult. 
In the third section, we discuss, as a digression some of the 
short- to intermediate-run policy measures that the Japan government 
could take. We examine the pros and cons of various devices to cope with 
the currently pressing issue of Japan1s accumulating current-account 
surplus, including import liberalization, exchange rate policy, expansive 
fiscal policy, and more focused incentives to increase investment. 
In the final section, we explore the possibility of future reforms 
in the international monetary regime. There would be little merit in 
returning to the adjustable-peg system or to a stricter fixed 
exchange-rate system, or to a gold standard. However, there may be some 
room to realize alternative ideas for reforms: for example, (1) to 
stabilize exchange rates and price levels by coordinating monetary 
policies among the major nations; (2) to oblige monetary authorities to 
pursue interventionist policies to contain exchange rates within a 
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prescribed zone; or (3) to let monetary authorities compete in making 
profits by (presumably) stabilizing interventions. Then, we apply a 
political-economic analysis (the calculus of participation) to speculate 
what kinds of regimes or reforms, if any, are more likely to be adopted, 
and we consider the role of Japan in this political process. 
I. Historical Development 
The Bretton Woods adjustable-peg system prevailed in the postwar 
international economy until 1971. In May 1971, the German and Dutch 
monetary autorities abandoned fixed parity for the mark and guilder and 
moved to floating exchange rates. The Japanese monetary authorities 
strongly resisted revaluating the yen, despite Japan's accumulating large 
surplus in its balance of payments. In August, President Nixon announced 
his New Economic Policy, which cut the already weakening link between the 
dollar and gold and placed a 10 per cent surcharge on imports to the 
United States, notably imports of manufactured goods. This policy was 
widely seen as aimed particularly, though by no means exclusively, at 
Japan. 
The basic principles of the Bretton Woods regime as originally 
conceived were: 
1. Exchange rates were normally fixed but could be changed up to 
10 per cent. A country could adjust its exchange rate by more than 10 
per cent if its balance of payments was judged as being in a "fundamental 
disequilibrium,!! which was not formally defined. 
2. The dollar was linked to gold at a fixed parity. The confi-
dence in the dollar was supported by this link. The United States 
supplied the liquidity for international transactions and for the growth 
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of foreign exchange reserves by providing dollars by increasing its 
short-term liabilities to the rest of the world. In this sense, this was 
a gold exchange-standard system, based on the dollar rather than on the 
pound as had been the case before World War I and in the 1920s. 
3. The adjustment of the balance of payments was primarily con-
ducted by macroeconomic policies of the nonreserve countries (namely, all 
countries other than the United States) and supplemented by the occasion-
al realignment of exchange rates. 
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Early on, Robert Triffin pointed to the liquidity dilemma as the 
fundamental instability in the Bretton Woods regime. To satisfy the 
increasing demand for international reserves, the United States would 
eventually undermine foreign confidence in the dollar because its 
gold-liability ratio would decline. The link between the dollar and gold 
was broken de facto during the 1960s. The dollar-based gold exchange 
system turned into a dollar-standard system where the dollar was valued 
not because it was supported by gold but because it functioned as a 
medium of international payments. 
An implicit principle of the dollar-standard system was that the 
United States would maintain domestic price stability, which would result 
in international price stability. In other words, the implicit quid pro 
quo for an increase in the U.S. dollars held by foreigners was a U.S. 
commitment to price stability. Robert Mundell advocated the following 
assignment of policies under the dollar standard: the United States 
adjusts its money supply so as to stabilize the international price 
level, and Europe and Japan (the rest of the world) adjust their money 
"Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis, Yale Univ. Press, 1960. 
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supplies to maintain balance-of-payments equilibrium. This application 
of his celebrated principle of policy instruments works well so long as 
these rules are observed. 
In the context of this policy-assignment argument, the degree of 
price stability in the United States was thus regarded as desirable by, 
or at least as acceptable to, the rest of the world. Those countries 
that, for whatever reasons, adopted policies of higher rates of inflation 
were able to devalue their currency from time to time under the 
adjustable-peg system (as, for example, France and Italy did). The 
problem, however, was West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s; it wanted a 
lower rate of domestic price increases, and its macroeconomic policies 
combined with good growth performance to generate substantial current-
account surpluses and increases in foreign exchange reserves. There was 
strong pressure on Germany to expand its domestic macroeconomic policy, 
but the Germans resisted. This "German" problem spread to other coun-
tries in the late 1960s as the United States financed the Vietnam war 
through inflationary means and as Japan1s current-account surpluses grew7 
substantially. Moreover, de Gaulle and France were unwilling to finance 
the United States by holding dollars since France, too, had started to 
run current account surpluses and came to insist increasingly that it be 
allowed to convert dollars into gold. The United States exercised moral 
suasion on other countries, particularly on Japan and to some degree on 
Germany, but this brought to the fore the problem that had worried 
Triffin earlier. To some extent, it reflected an unwillingness to go 
Robert A. Mundell, 
Monetary Theory: Inflation, Interest and Growth in 
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along with U.S. macroeconomic policy, not only for reasons of price 
stability but for political reasons over the United States? use of its 
assets to engage in the Vietnam war. 
Thus, the question was whether there were sufficient incentives for 
national authorities to pursue the set of policies implicitly assigned to 
them in the Bretton Woods system. For Japan (or the rest of the world), 
incentives existed to adopt contractionary policies when the balance of 
payments was in deficit, and accordingly the system was binding. Howev-
er, Japan, or more empirically relevant Germany, did not always have an 
incentive to adopt expansionary policies when the balance of payments was 
in surplus. Nor did the United States necessarily have the incentive to 
play the role of a benevolent leader by adjusting its macroeconomic 
policies to keep the world price level constant, 
In fact, two of the major reasons why the Bretton Woods regime 
collapsed are that the rest of the world did not play the game symmetri-
cally with respect to booms and recessions and that the United States, 
particularly after its involvement in Vietnam, came to be concerned not 
so much with world price stability as with its own national policy 
objectives. 
Japanese policymakers were strongly committed to the fixed exchange 
parity before Nixon1s New Economic Policy. Japanese government officials 
were proud that since 1949 Japan had not changed the exchange parity to 
the dollar. Japan was, and liked to think of itself as, an "honor 
the World Economy, Pacific Palisades, California, Goodyear Publishing, 
1973. 
Hamada op, cit. 
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student11 in the (old) IMF regime. Japanese policymakers apparently never 
conceived of using changes in the exchange rate as an instrument of 
balance-of-payments policy until such action was forced on them after 
1971. After all, although some of Japan1s balance-of-payments deficits 
in the 1950s and 1960s resulted from an overheated economy, there were 
occasions when the deficit was a consequence of changes in the external 
environment (world recession, the Suez crisis). It might have been 
reasonable at those periods for Japan to devalue rather than slow down 
the growth rate through restrictive policies. One reason for this was a 
sense of prestige: a successful, civilized country did not engage in 
exchange rate devaluations (though France had, and indeed England had in 
1949). Another reason might have been an acute realization that Japan 
was beginning to expand in world markets, that it had had difficulty 
obtaining access to foreign markets (many countries continued to restrict 
Japanese imports under the GATT Article 35 exemption), and that any 
Japanese devaluations would have been taken as a beggar-ray-neighbor 
policy and were not politically desirable because of the possibility of 
retaliation. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the adherence of the Japanese govern-
ment to the fixed parity of $1 to ¥360 was too extreme. The mere discus-
sion of flexible exchange rates was virtually taboo in the mass media. 
Even Japanese economists, including one of us, went no further than a 
lukewarm proposal of a crawling peg for the yen. Whereas most countries 
that had been under the fixed exchange rates immediately closed their 
foreign exchange markets on President Nixon1s announcement and shifted to 
floating exchange rates a week or so later, Japan alone kept its foreign 
exchange market open. As a result, the Bank of Japan bought about $4 
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billion at the overpriced exchange rate of ¥360, incurring a huge loss 
for Japanese taxpayers. Finally, the monetary authorities gave in, and 
the yen was allowed to float and appreciate. Some policymakers seemed to 
believe that trying to support the old dollar value would be appreciated 
as conduct faithful to the principle of the (old) IMF regime. 
Careful consideration is necessary to clarify the welfare effect of 
this purchase of dollars during fall 1971. At that time, Japan imposed 
severe exchange controls that prohibited foreigners from purchasing yen 
assets with dollars; only Japanese corporations (mainly trading companies 
and the shipbuilding companies, which had huge dollar claims outstanding 
through deferred sales of ships) were allowed to so so. Under such 
circumstances, the exchange rate policy was a measure by which the 
Japanese government deliberately shifted the costs of exchange rate 
appreciation from private business engaged in international trade to the 
government. One might argue that this was not wrong since those compa-
nies had been operating under a set of rules of the game they believed to 
be inviolate that were suddenly changed. Moreover, a number of trading 
companies might have otherwise gone bankrupt, with serious spillover 
effects on the domestic economy as well as on Japan's foreign trade 
capabilities. In this sense at least, the policy of shifting the burden 
from the private sector to the govenment might well have been stabiliz-
ing. (Note that this occurred only at a time when a major change in the 
rules of the game was completely unanticipated.) Needless to say, 
Ryutaro Komiya and Miyako Suda, Gendai Kinyu Ron, Nihonkeizai 
Shimbun, 1983, Vo,. II, pp. 24-25. 
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however, the tax payer eventually had to bear the burden shifted to the 
government. 
There was a short interlude of new fixed exchange rates (with a new 
parity of $1 to ¥308) with a wider band of permissible fluctuations. 
Known as the Smithsonian system, this regime lasted from December 1971 to 
February 1973. The momentum toward flexible rates had already passed the 
point of no return, however. The resurgence of financial crises in 
Europe and the increased demand for the yen made it necessary for Japa-
nese monetary authorities to join in adopting flexible exchange rates in 
February 1973. Japan adopted the flexible exchange-rate system over a 
weekend, at a. time when all the other major countries were taking the 
same action, This action demonstrated that monetary authorities could 
act swiftly when forced to by external events. At that time, it would 
have been senseless for Japan to try to keep the yen pegged to the dollar 
or to any other currency. 
As Mundell argued, some monetary coordination was indispensable to 
the proper functioning of the fixed exchange-rate system. The Bretton 
Woods regime failed because the system did not have sufficient incentive 
mechanisms. 
Because of the cost-benefit structure of the game of choosing an 
international regime, crisis often becomes the catalyst for financial 
8 
reforms. In the game of choosing or agreeing on a rule, the present 
system or status quo continues as long as there is no agreement. Insti-
tutional reforms are realized when the current status quo becomes intol-
erable for the participating countries. Richard Cooper has argued that 
Hamada op. cit., pp. 17-21. 
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rule changes frequently come about de facto as a result of gradually 
changing economic circumstances. Only later are those changes in the 
implicit rules specified and codified. Many international monetary 
crises between 1971 and 1983 brought on the change from the 
dollar-standard system to flexible exchange rates. 
The adoption of flexible exchange rates was not the result of a 
coordinated, planned, and deliberate decision of the participating 
countries. Rather, it was a necessary escape from an impasse and a 
measure against an emergency. Only in 1976 did the IMF interim committee 
agree in Jamaica on the basic rules of the international monetary system 
and allow adoption of flexible exchange rates. The flexible 
exchange-rate system itself does not, at least prima facie, call for any 
cooperation between governments. The direct link among price levels in 
the participating countries that had existed under the adjustable-peg 
system was ended by the adoption of flexible exchange rates. Except for 
9 
more subtle linkages, the primary economic linkages resulting from 
synchronized price levels were virtually severed. Each national monetary 
authority recovered substantial control over monetary policy. The rules 
of the game do not bind participating countries very tightly. As a first 
approximation, the flexible exchange-rate system can be termed a 
it 1 0 nonsystem. 
M. Canzoneri and J.A. Gray, "Monetary Policy Games and the 
Consequences of Non cooperative Behavior,ff International Economic Review, 
1985. 
Max Corden, "The Logic of the International Monetary Non-System," 
in F. Machlup ed. Reflection of a Troubled World Economy, London, 
Macmillan 1983. 
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Needless to say, the system adopted by the major industrial coun-
tries after February 1973 is not a freely floating exchange-rates system. 
Of the different kinds of floating systems, one is that of the clean 
float (completely flexible exchange rates) in which supply and demand 
determine the exchange rate without intervention by the monetary authori-
ties of any country and without exchange rate controls. Another, is very 
short-term intervention when markets are disorderly; typically the 
stabilizing intervention lasts only for a matter of hours or at most a 
few days. In the managed float system, central banks systematically 
intervene in the market to affect the exchange rate; intervention either 
results in an undervalued currency (beggar~my-neighbor), or maintains an 
overvalued currency. The monetary authorities of most industrial coun-
tries have intervened to smooth out short-term fluctuations and occasion-
ally to influence the direction of exchange rates. If various national 
monetary authorities simultaneously engage in foreign exchange interven-
tions, then the monetary interdependence observed under fixed exchange 
rates reappears to some degree and creates the possibility of strategic 
interaction. 
As it evolved in the 1970s, the flexible exchange-rate system was at 
first a floating arrangement among the major nations: the United States, 
Great Britian, Japan, Canada, and the European Community. The European 
Community tried to establish a fixed exchange-rate mechanism among their 
currencies (or at least an adjustable-peg system) in the form of the 
European Monetary System, such that their rates floated against non-EC 
currencies but not against each other1s (except within the band in which 
Hamada, op. cit. Ch. 8. 
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the snake danced). Finally, most of the developing countries chose to 
peg their exchange rate to that of a major trading partner, to the 
IMF-based special drawing-rights (SDR) unit, or to a trade-weighted 
basket. Some of the countries pursued flexible or crawling-peg rates 
(for example, Brazil) because of internal circumstances, particularly 
when internal inflation rates were high. 
Since 1971, the yen-dollar exchange rate has fluctuated widely, and 
the level of international reserves held by the Japanese monetary author-
ities has tended upward (see figs. 1 and 2). Has intervention by the 
Japanese monetary authorities helped stabilize the value of the yen? 
Since interest payments accrue to international reserves, the reserves 
should increase slightly even without intervention. With this minor 
caveat, the increase (or decrease) in reserves implies net buying (or 
selling) interventions. Thus, Figure 2 adequately reflects the general 
trends and fluctuations of interventions. 
For government interventions to be stabilizing, they should normally 
be profitable; that is, a government should purchase its own currency 
(sell foreign currency) when its own currency is appreciating and should 
sell its currency when it is depreciating. The massive purchase of 
dollars during the disorderly period of 1971 was definitely 
12 destabilizing. Some sales during 1973 may have been destabilizing as 
well. Since that time, however, the Japanese monetary authorities have 
often engaged in stabilization by selling the dollar when it reached a 
peak and buying when it reached a trough. From 1974 to 1976, the move-
One might of course argue that it was a temporary, rescuing 
operation during this chaotic period of major change in rules, as we have 
argued above. 
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meat of the yen exchange rate was moderate, and the intensity of inter-
ventions was weak. From the latter half of 1977 to late 1978, however, 
the monetary authorities bought dollars (sold yen), even though the yen 
was appreciating. This "leaning against the wind" caused controversy 
with the United States since Japan1s global and bilateral current-account 
13 
surplus increased sharply and unexpectedly,' However, the appreciation 
eventually became excessive. When the dollar hit a record low in 1978, 
Japan1s international reserves reached a historical high. After an 
announcement of joint action by the Japanese and U.S. monetary authori-
ties, the exchange rate changed direction. This movement toward lower 
values for the yen was reinforced by the second oil crisis. The pattern 
of buying the dollar at a trough and selling it at a peak generally 
continued until 1983. 
It is not easy to determine whether interventions are stabilizing or 
not. Much depends on whether currencies come to be misaligned because of 
changes in fundamental factors or whether the exchange rate movements 
represent overshooting beyond an equilibrium rate. It is not always 
clear whether the monetary authorities should be reinforcing the direc-
tion of change ("leaning with the wind") or resisting it ("leaning 
against the wind"). 
Based on the familiar argument by Milton Friedman, Dean Taylor 
calculated the profits and losses accruing to interventions by monetary 
authorities and contended that monetary authorities were destabilizing 
the foreign exchange market. His dictum for private agents was to bet 
See Hugh T. Patrick, "The Economic Dimensions of the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance," in Daniel I. Okimoto, ed. Japan*s Economy — Coping with 
Change in the International Environment (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982 
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against the central bank in order to make profits and indirectly contrib-
14 
ute to economic welfare. Helmut Mayer and Hiroo Taguchi questioned the 
appropriateness of using profitability as the main criterion* They 
argued that the criteria for stabilization should be whether interven-
tions help exchange rates approach the moving average trend of exchange 
rates and whether interventions, viewed ex post, succeed in leaning 
against the wind. They concluded that most of the interventions by 
Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom had a stabilizing impact. 
To understand the movements among multiple exchange rates, where 
there are multiple sources of real and nominal disturbances and where 
expectations of market participants change endogenously in response to 
the rules of interventions -- let alone to be able to identify the 
contribution of government interventions in the exchange market -- one 
needs to develop analytical models further. It also should be emphasized 
that some important turning points in the yen-dollar exchange rate were 
induced by the announcement of joint actions by central bankers. By 
October 1978, for example, the value of the dollar had fallen to ¥176, 
less than half the ¥360 rate that had prevailed for more than 20 years 
before the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime. It seemed clear that 
the dollar was undervalued and the yen was overvalued. On November 1, 
1978, the United States announced a policy package to defend the value of 
Dean Taylor, "Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange 
Market, or Bet Against the Central Bank," Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 90, No. 2, (April 1982). For the original argument by Friedman, see 
Milton Friedman, "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates," in his Essays in 
Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press, 1953. 
Helmut Mayer and Hiroo Taguchi, "Official Interventions in the 
Exchange Markets: Stabilizing or Destabilizing," BIS Economic Papers No. 
6, Bank for International Settlements, Basle, No. 6, March 1983. 
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the dollar, based on separate consultations with West Germany, Switzer-
land, and Japan. Simultaneously with the U.S. announcement, the governor 
of the Bank of Japan held a press conference, at the unusual hour of 
11:00 P.M., and announced an increase in the magnitude of a swap agree-
ment between the United States and Japan as well as his intention to 
engage in a dollar buying operation. These mutual announcements had a 
dramatic and immediate effect on the yen exchange rate. 
This joint action seems to have been successful because it was a 
joint decision involving action by both Japan and the United States and 
because private participants in the foreign exchange market perceived 
that the yen was indeed overvalued. The market was very susceptible to a 
signal from the monetary authorities reinforcing its concern that perhaps 
the yen had appreciated too much. Certainly, the unusual degree of 
appreciation of the real exchange rate was a factor that made market 
participants suspicious of the existing market rates. 
In some instances, however, coordinated interventions have not had 
much impact. In early August 1983, for example, joint intervention did 
not halt the strengthening of the dollar. The reasons for this failure 
require further research. At the time, the movement of the real exchange 
rate was not marked. In fact, the real exchange rate as computed by 
various indexes showed a more mixed picture than it had in 1978 when 
every dollar index had moved downward. 
During 1983 and 1984, exchange rate movements became less volatile 
and there is little evidence of substantial interventions. Until Septem-
ber 1985, the United States enunciated a policy of nonintervention. 
After 1983, the Japanese monetary authorities appeared to have shifted 
from a managed float to almost a clean float. 
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During 1982-86, however, Japan1s overall current-account surplus, 
the United States1 overall current-account deficit, and Japan's bilateral 
current-account surplus with the United States began to grow to huge 
levels (see Table 1). By 1985, the United States was no longer willing 
to accept its intolerably large and rapidly growing trade and 
current-account deficits, and not surprisingly it associated much of its 
trade problems with Japan1s burgeoning success. The macroeconomic 
sources of these deficits and surpluses can be classified into (1) 
differences in respective phases in the business cycle; (2) changes in 
relative prices of exports and imports as reflected in an increasingly 
overvalued dollar and undervalued yen; and (3) changes in production and 
spending behavior and policies (private and public spending, savings, and 
investment) in the two countries. 
In our view, the fundamental cause was the basic structural and 
policy situation in each country (the absorption approach), the fluctua-
tions in nominal and real exchange rates were of lesser importance. 
Indeed, exchange rates can be viewed as largely reflecting underlying 
structural conditions and respective macroeconomic policies and the 
expectations of market participants regarding the future course of these 
factors; even so, an overvalued dollar and undervalued yen surely made 
the huge trade imbalances that developed in the 1980s even more extreme. 
More precisely, Japan1s current-account surplus was a consequence of the 
tendency for private saving to outstrip private investment demand while 
For a somewhat different view, see Y, Shinkai, "Internationaliz-
ation of Finance in Japair? in this volume. There are various issues: the 
degree of price elasticity of imports and exports; adjustments of under-
lying costs and hence changes in real exchanges rates; and the time 
period adjustments take, 
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government budget deficits, so large in the latter half of the 1970s, 
were being reduced. With low interest rates at home, Japanese were eager 
to accumulate net wealth abroad. In the United States, the major change 
in the domestic macroeconomic balance lay in the rapidly increasing and 
ultimately immense federal budget deficit, far beyond the capacity of 
domestic savings to finance if it were also to finance domestic private 
investment. Monetary policy achieved price stability, in part by main-
taining relatively high interest rates, especially in real terms; those 
interest rates attracted foreign capital to finance, indirectly at least, 
up to one-half the federal budget deficit, with a concomitant inflow of 
imports of goods and services in excess of exports. 
Many economists place greater, and more direct, emphasis on exchange 
rates, arguing that the huge U*S, trade deficit and Japanese surplus 
resulted from the overvaluation of the dollar, that is, the misalignment 
of exchange rates. As shown in Figure 5, the yenfs real exchange rate 
vis-a-vis the dollar tended to depreciate from 1980 until 1985. This 
tendency was stronger in terms of the wholesale price index than of the 
consumer price index. Compared with the 1975 level, the real exchange 
rate in terms of unit labor costs declined sharply. This suggests that 
Japanese manufactured products gained substantial competitiveness during 
1975-85. 
Then came the fascinating experiment of the Group of Five. The 
finance ministers of the five countries announced their intent to inter-
vene in the foreign exchange market (the Plaza Agreement of September 22, 
1985). As a result, the value of the dollar dropped by 37 per cent from 
¥243 in September 1985 to ¥153 in September 1986. 
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The effects of the intervention on various currencies were uneven. 
During the year after the joint intervention, the British pound appreci-
ated only a little against the dollar. The West German mark appreciated 
substantially. The yen appreciated by some 59 percent against the dollar 
(viewed from the perspective of the yen). To what extent this revalua-
tion of the yen was caused by the joint intervention remains unclear, and 
the reasons for the effectiveness of this intervention have yet to be 
explored. Here, we consider several possible reasons for the apparent 
success of the coordinated intervention since it is important not only 
for itself but also for what it tells us about the possibilities of 
successful intervention in the future, 
First, the announcement was made in such a way as to maximize the 
feeling of surprise in the market. Joint actions were prepared in 
secrecy and announced on the weekend, when markets were closed. Japanese 
trading companies and financial institutions had been warned against 
excessive speculation in the form of accumulating credits in dollars, but 
whether they took this as a sign of future interventions is not clear. 
In any case, the announcement came as a surprise and indicated strongly 
that the Reagan administration had abandoned its policy of benign neglect 
by refraining from intervening in the market. 
The amount of currencies used in interventions by the Japanese 
central bank and other central banks has not been well, publicized. Sam 
Cross, vice-president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, revealed some 
fragmentary evidence on the magnitude of currency interventions by 
several governments. According to him, from September 22 to the end o 
October 1985, the U.S* monetary authorities sold about $3.2 billion, of 
which $1.4 billion was used to purchase yen. Other members of the Group 
of Five sold about $5 billion, and the other countries in the Group of 
Ten (the Group of Five plus Canada, Italy, Sweden, Belgium and the 
Netherlands) intervened with about $2 billion. The currency composition 
of those interventions has not been reported. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the movement of exchange rates and the changes 
in international reserves held by the Japanese monetary authorities in 
1985 and 1986. If we neglect the accrual of interest payments, the 
changes in international reserves can be regarded as the amount of 
intervention. During September 1985, Japanese foreign exchange reserves 
decreased by about $1 billion. Cross described the sentiment of the 
Tokyo market after September 22: 
During the next few days, there was some skepticism in the 
market that the lower dollar levels would be maintained, and a 
number of commercial customers responded to the apparently 
attractive rates by buying dollars. This phenomenon was most 
dramatic in Tokyo where, when the market opened on Tuesday, 
September 24, after a three-day weekend, dollar demand from 
corporations and investors spurred the largest turnover on 
record for spot dollar/yen trading. The Bank of Japan, respond-
ed with massive dollar sales. . . . Following these and other 
Sam Y. Cross, "Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchan' 
Operations," FRBNY Quarterly Reivew, Winter 1985-86, pp. 45-48. 
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operations in subsequent days by the Japanese and other G-5 
central banks, market participants came to believe that the 
authorities were firmly committed to the joint effort and 
18 
upward pressure on the dollar abated,f! 
Another factor in the success of the intervention was that the Bank 
of Japan did not adopt a policy of sterilizing the intervention. On the 
contrary, it maintained its contractionary monetary policy during 1985. 
On October 24, it let short-term interest rates on bonds jump from 5,6 
per cent to 6.3 per cent? causing a panic in the newly established 
futures trading market in government bonds. 
The strength of the leadership of the governor of the Bank of Japan 
after September 1985 was impressive. He (and perhaps the finance minis-
ter) strongly signaled their intention to let the yen appreciate and not 
to reduce interest rates until the yen had appreciated significantly and 
until interest rates in the United States had declined sufficiently to 
narrow the interest differential* The several shocks to the Japanese 
financial markets -- the initial strong intervention, the October 24 
decision to allow interest rates on bonds to climb and the other measures 
taken to heighten uncertainty -- clearly had a severe impact on expecta-
tions. The uncertainty concerning the price range and the timing of the 
Bank of Japan1s interventions made it difficult for the renewed capital 
outflow that one might expect, given the continuing (real) interest rate 
differentials between Japan and the United States, to occur. 
In view of the strong impact compared to the relatively small scale 
of intervention, the effect was quite dramatic. The apparent efficacy of 
Cross, op. cit. 
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interventions can be explained only by taking into account its effect on 
the expectations of private agents. Presumably, the joint announcement 
after the secretive planning was made just at the time when the general 
publicfs belief in the strength of the dollar was about to erode. There 
had been many predictions of a sudden or gradual fall of the dollar, 
which had peaked in early March 1985, but market sentiment had not 
followed these predictions, until September when the Group of Five 
intervention provided a new impetus, 
Once the balance of bearish and bullish expectations changed, the 
Japanese monetary authorities were able to ease their stance. On January 
29, 1986, the Bank of Japan reduced the official discount rate from 5 per 
cent to 4.5 per cent. The value of the yen was not much affected, and it 
even showed some signs of a slight appreciation. Market participants 
seemed to consider that betting against the monetary authorities was too 
dangerous. 
Moreover, the drastic decline in oil prices in late 1985 and the 
improvement in the terms of trade for Japan effected a further apprecia-
tion of the yen. Takatoshi Ito convincingly demonstrates, through an 
examination of hourly changes in exchange rates during a global business 
day of 24 hours, that the dominant determinants were the U.S. attitude 
toward exchange rates in September 1985, the Bank of Japan's 
high-interest rate policy in late October, and the sharp decrease in oil 
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prices after December 1985. 
Takatoshi Ito, "The Intra Daily Exchange Rate Dynamics and 
Monetary Policies After G5,f! NBER working paper, 1986. 
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I. General Assessment of the Present System 
Despite its imperfections, the present system of flexible exchange 
rates does, in our opinion, provide an international monetary framework 
that satisfies minimum standards. The present system allows sufficient 
freedom to monetary authorities to pursue their own policies almost 
independently of the activities of the monetary authorities of other 
countries. We use the word almost because there are some positive or 
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negative spillover effects even under the freely floating regime. The 
intensity of interdependence, however, is indirect and of a second order 
compared with the intensity of interdependence in the fixed exchange-rate 
system, in which national price levels are directly linked. After the 
adoption of flexible exchange rates, the world economy came under the 
strong attacks of real disturbances, notably the two oil crises. None-
theless, the present flexible exchange-rate system survived these distur-
bances without the financial panics experienced under the adjustable-peg 
system and without the imposition of exchange controls. 
This recent experience has taught us, however, that the flexibility 
of exchange rates is not by itself a deus ex machina that can solve all 
external imbalances. Most of the earlier advocates of flexible exchange 
rates seemed to think that flexible of exchange rates would balance 
current accounts; presumably they assumed a world in which capital flows 
were not particularly large. In contrast, in the present world where 
capital mobility is nearly perfect, the flexibility of exchange rates 
does not equilibrate current accounts. Whereas goods markets are slug-
gish in adjusting, the foreign exchange market is a volatile market where 
the excess demand for outstanding stocks of foreign-denominated financial 
Canzoneri and Gray, o£. cit. 
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assets clears instantaneously. Moreover, goods markets are usually 
constrained by the past course of prices, but foreign exchange rates jump 
around in response to changes in expectations of future exchange rates 
and underlying macroeconomic variables. These differences are quite 
likely to give rise to a situation in which nominal exchange rates as 
well as the corresponding real exchange rates are quite different from 
the value that would balance current accounts. 
The often-cited wide discrepancy between the real exchange rate and 
the rate that purchasing power parity theory predicts probably implies 
this kind of divergence. Divergence can occur when exogenous disturban-
ces shift the equilibrium rate and asset markets react to them quickly 
21 
while goods markets adjust only slowly. In this case, even if the 
public were to find the right convergent path intuitively, the initial 
jump of the exchange rate would still be considerable. Divergence can 
also occur, when the path diverges from the converging path to a "bubble 
path," where only instantaneous arbitrage conditions are set and trans-
22 
versality conditions are not fulfilled. 
The existence of a trade or a current account surplus by no means 
implies a misalignment of exchange rates. If two or more nations have 
different ratios of time preferences and accordingly different saving 
21 
Rudiger Dornbusch, "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics." 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 84, December 1976, pp. 1161 - 76. 
22 
Kunio Okina, "Speculative Bubbles and Official Intervention." 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1983. What struck us during 
the period of overvaluation of the dollar was, however, the sustained 
divergence of the value of the dollar relative to other currencies, and 
not simply volatility. We question whether this kind of sustained 
divergence can be explained by "bubbles" which is presumably a short-term 
phenomenon. 
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ratiosj the equilibrium growth path may imply continuing trade or 
current-account surpluses (or deficits). For example, in light of 
Japan1s high personal savings ratio and the low U.S. savings ratio, a 
continuing Japanese current-account surplus and U.S. deficit is a plausi-
23 ble phenomenon, at least analytically if not politically (see below). 
Japan1s current-account surplus and the United States 
current-account deficit should be examined in global terms, not just in 
terms of the bilateral imbalance, because the efficient allocation of 
resources should be achieved globally rather than bilaterally and should 
be reflected in the global balance-of-payments position of each country. 
Moreover, it is not simply the difference in savings rates between two 
countries but the differences in rates of return on new investments that 
make it attractive to invest in one country or the other. Further 
complicating the case of the United States has been the Reagan adminis-
tration^ commitment to increasing total budget expenditures substantial-
ly, mainly for military purposes without a concomitant increase in tax 
revenues. 
In any event, the difference in the speed of adjustment between 
goods markets and asset markets and the possibility of bubbles are often 
believed to make actual exchange rates diverge from the exchange rates 
that would govern some normal flow of international trade and investment. 
John Williamson utilizes the concept of a fundamental equilibrium ex-
change rate (FEER), that is, the exchange rate that would generate a 
Koichi Hamada and Kazumasa Iwata, "The Significance of Different 
Saving Ratios for the Current Account: The U.S. - Japan Case,11 mimeo 
1985. This is consistent with our view that American policy makers have 
been willing to run huge Federal budget deficits and finance them in part 
through foreign borrowing both direct and indirect. 
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current-account imbalance equal to the underlying net capital inflow or 
24 
outflow. This rate is presumably determined by fundamental factors. 
According to his calculations, in the first quarter of 1983 the U.S. 
dollar was overvalued by about 23 per cent and the Japanese yen was 
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undervalued by 10 per cent from the FEER. By early 1985 these 
deviations were substantially wider. He considers these misalignments to 
be even more important than the high degree of volatility of exchange 
rates. 
According to Williamson, the costs of these misalignments and 
volatility are uncertainty in trade, distortion of consumption patterns, 
adjustment costs, unemployment, excess capacity, and pressures for 
protectionism. His argument would probably be true if some person or 
government, could specify precisely the. degree as well as the direction of 
misalignment. If that were possible, then the case for some form of 
managed float could easily be made. 
The basic difficulty intrinsic to this problem is, however, that it 
is hard to determine very precisely whether the exchange rate is diver-
gent from the level that the fundamentals would predict. There have been 
times, for example, 1982 or early 1985, when many people considered the 
yen-dollar exchange rate to be misaligned. During these periods, howev-
er, the yen remained relatively weak and the dollar strong. Market 
participants were aware of possible misalignments, but the market ex-
change rate did not change. 
John Williamson, The Exchange Rate System, Institute for 
International Economics, Washington, B.C. 1983, revised version June 
1985. 
'Williamson op. cit. p. 34. 
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Another factor of importance is the ongoing and large difference in 
long-term interest rates between the United States and other countries, 
notably Japan. Added to that was the liberalization in Japan of portfo-
lio restrictions on life insurance companies and pension funds to allow 
long-term investments in foreign assets. In early 1985, a portfolio 
manager for a Japanese life insurance company stated that his company 
focused on the long-run yield over twenty years, to balance its require-
ments for payout periods, and that he regarded it as extremely unlikely 
that the yen would appreciate five percent a year on average over twenty 
years, which was the difference in interest rate returns on long-term 
financial assets in Japan and the United States. His was apparently a 
good long-run investment strategy. However, it turned out to be a poor 
short-run investment strategy since the yen appreciated so much after 
Japanese insurance companies started purchasing dollar financial assets. 
(These losses were fortuitously offset in part by higher bond prices as 
U.S. interest rates declined.) Nonetheless, it does suggest that if the 
substantial interest rate gap for long-term assets persists, Japanese 
long-term financial institutions will continue to enter the market and 
demand dollars. 
Needless to say? in international monetary matters that involve 
political negotiations, governments know what private agents do not know. 
If a government can use extra information to narrow deviations of its 
exchange rate from the FEER, then it could use its informational edge in 
interventions, thereby giving the right signals to market participants 
uncertain about the appropriateness of current exchange rates. The 
reason why the joint announcement of the Group of Five worked well in 
fall 1985 was probably that there was sufficient doubt about the 
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continuing trend. This also suggests interventions are most successful 
in extreme conditions, such as in November 1978 or September 1985, when 
expectations can easily be influenced. 
The exchange rate system cannot be evaluated in isolation from its 
impact on other systemic components of the international economic system. 
Although perhaps not the fault of the flexible rate system -- since the 
same imbalance might well have occurred under a fixed exchange rate or 
some other system -- the large U.S. trade and current-account deficits in 
the 1980s (see Table 1) have profoundly adverse implications not only for 
the U.S. economy and for U.S.-Japan economic relations but for the 
international economic system as a whole. The two major systemic effects 
are the increase in protectionist sentiments and policies in the United 
States and the shift in the United States' position from the world1s 
largest creditor nation to its largest debtor. During the same period, 
Japan emerged as the largest creditor nation in the world; most of its 
foreign assets are held in U.S. bonds and short-term financial instru-
ments, but investment in equities, direct investment, including real 
estate, and other dollar-denominated claims are increasing. Although 
Japan began to be a creditor nation in the early 1970s, the tendency was 
masked by the two oil crises. Its emergence as a creditor nation in the 
1980s was amplified and accelerated by the U.S. deficits. 
The increase in American protectionist sentiment and actions in the 
1980s stems from many causes, analysis of which is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Surely the immense trade deficits contributed substantially 
A tentative conjecture is that when the distribution of beliefs is 
more diverse, the effectiveness of intervention will be stronger. This 
is, of coursej subject to further testing. 
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to perceptions -- correct or not -- in the United States, particularly in 
Congress, that the U.S. economy was being seriously hurt and that the 
foreign trading system somehow did not treat U.S. participants fairly. 
In facts the burgeoning trade deficits of the 1980s were primarily the 
unintended consequence of domestic macroeconomic policies, notably the 
tax cuts and the expansion of the federal budget after 1981. In retro-
spect , it was a profound policy error. One great danger is that the 
United States will shift to a substantially more protectionist position 
in trade policy by the end of the 1980s. That would have significantly 
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adverse effects on the international trading system. The experience of 
the 1980s raises a fundamental systemic question: Is it economically and 
politically possible to have both a free trading system and a system of 
free international financial flows? If the consequence is extreme trade 
imbalances (in amounts and as percentages of GNP) among the major partic-
ipants, especially the United States, the answer may well turn out to be 
no. Howeverj the problem is not the system of exchange rates and trade 
and capital flows per se but the underlying macroeconomic policies and 
structural conditions in each country. 
The longer-run implications of the United States1 becoming a huge 
debtor nation -- say, $600-1,000 billion by 1990 -- and of Japan1s 
becoming a major creditor nation -- say, $450-600 billion by 1990 -- are 
only beginning to be understood. It is unclear how long and in what 
amounts these respective foreign debts (current-account deficits) and 
assets (current-account surpluses) will accumulate. What is clear is 
For a discussion of the trade regime see the chapter by Komiya and 
Itoh in this volume. 
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that even if these imbalances are eliminated completely, the adjustment 
process will take time, and at the minimum the respective debtor and 
creditor positions will be absolutely very large. Moreover, it is likely 
that a great preponderance of Japanese claims will be in dollars, and on 
the United States. 
The interest, dividend, and profit income to be paid by the United 
States and received by Japan will become substantial and will affect the 
structural composition of merchandise and service trade in each country. 
Manufactured goods production and exports in the United States will grow 
rapidly relative to GNP, and manufactured goods production in Japan will 
slow down, with potentially significant effects on the structure of 
domestic production in each country. How much will depend on the cumula-
tive size of the net debt or assets, foreign investment income flows, and 
the degree to which current-account imbalances persist. 
The continuing net outflow of Japanese capital and the accumulation 
of such a large net foreign asset position will mean that both the 
Japanese government and Japanese private financial institutions will 
become dominant players in world financial markets, a rapid quantitative 
and qualitative expansion of trends begun in the early 1980s. The yen 
will almost inevitably become an increasingly important reserve currency 
and transaction currency. Japanese financial institutions will have 
certain, competitive advantages in assuming the management of these 
financial assets.. 
Such a large U.S.-Japan debtor-creditor position will inevitably 
make the bilateral relationship more complex and its management more 
complicated. A new, rather blunt, policy instrument will have been added 
to bilateral governmental negotiations. The situation will be fraught 
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with danger because the possibilities of mutual damage are so great. A 
Japanese withdrawal of capital from the United States could precipitate a 
crisis in the United States of very high interest rates, recession, and a 
sharply declining dollar-yen exchange rate, but Japanese investors would 
concurrently take immense exchange losses. Actions by the United States 
that reduced the value of Japanese assets -- by inflation, freezing, or 
other acts -- would much reduce U.S. credibility. Even the threat to 
take such actions would sharply reduce confidence. Recognition of these 
costs might even result in greater cooperation in the bilateral bargain-
ing game between the United States and Japan; the symbiotic relationship 
in defense and trade will gain a debt dimension. At any rate, this new 
debtor-creditor relationship almost certainly will become an important 
new element in the interrelationships among bilateral issues of trade, 
finance, investment, exchange rates, macroeconomic policies, and perhaps 
even defense. 
Short-run to Intermediate Policy Alternatives for Japan 
There are several policy areas in which the Japanese government may 
be able to contribute to the solution of current and intermediate-run 
KI 2 8 
problems. 
The national income-accounting identity shows that the 
current-account surplus is a measure of the net surplus savings of the 
national economy as a whole; that is, the sum of private net savings and 
government net savings. Thus, an immediate and effective measure to 
A recent discussion of the issues appears in the essays and 
discussion in Hugh T. Patrick and Ryuichiro Tachi, editors, Japan 
and the United States Today: Exchange Rates, Macroeconomic Policies, 
and Financial Market Innovations (New York: Center on Japanese Economy 
and Business, Columbia University, 1987). 
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reduce Japan?s trade surplus would be to increase government expenditure 
or to reduce tax revenue? unless private net savings increase to offset 
completely the increase in government net absorption. Although some 
neo-Ricardian economists maintain that private spending offsets 
government action more or less completely (the rational expectations 
approach), we do not think that complete offset is a reality for either 
the Japanese or the U.S. economy. Accordingly, the Japanese 
current-account surplus will be reduced if Japanese fiscal policy becomes 
more expansionary. Changes in the exchange rate and terms of trade 
promote adjustment by affecting consumption as well as investment deci-
sions. For example, substantially cheaper prices for imported goods 
encourage greater consumption and less saving by private savers. None-
theless, the main point of our argument still remains, namely, changes in 
exchange rates and terms of trade do not reduce current-account surpluses 
unless they effectively influence the net surplus savings of the national 
economy. 
Moreover, a policy of trade liberalization, including politically 
difficult sectors such as agriculture and services, should be welcomed 
for its own sake in order to promote efficiency and to benefit consumers. 
We certainly do not underestimate the importance of trade liberalization, 
but unless liberalization efforts affect the terms of trade strongly 
enough to change the net savings pattern of the national economy, the 
impact of such measures on Japan1s current-account surplus will be 
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modest. 
Koichi Hamada and Yoshiro Nakajo, ffTrade Issues and Consumer 
Interests: The Japanese Experience." Paper presented at OECD Symposium 
on International Trade and Consumer Interests, 1984. See also C. Fred 
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Foreign exchange interventions combined with contractionary monetary 
policy can have a considerable effect on the exchange rate, as exempli-
fied by the Group of Five's interventions. However, by the same 
reasoning, in the case of trade liberalization, the effect on the 
current-account surplus will be limited without drastic real appreciation 
of the yen. 
Of course, it is one thing to say that fiscal expansion is effec-
tive; it is quite another to say whether the political environment in 
Japan enables or forces the government to adopt more expansionary fiscal 
policies. Since 1981, Japan as an integral element of its administrative 
reform program has been undergoing a fiscal consolidation by reducing 
deficit financing in the budget, resistance to the misuse of resources in 
the government sector is strong. The Ministry of Finance has been 
reluctant to introduce any measures that would increase the general 
budget deficit. Unless foreign pressures for macroeconomic expansion 
counteract this resistance or unless Japan falls into a severe recession, 
Japanese fiscal measures are unlikely to be substantially expansionary. 
Moreover, during most of the early 1980s, the domestic need for fiscal 
stimulus was not obvious. After the Group of Fivefs intervention, the 
30 
situation became somewhat different because of the slowdown in growth. 
It is quite possible to imagine a scenario in which Japanese growth 
declines sharply after 1986 (to substantially less than three per cent) 
Bergsten and William R. Cline, The United States-Japan Economic Problem 
(Washington: Institute for International Economics, revised edition 
1987). 
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Patrick and Tachi, op. cit.? focuses on the adjustments following 
the G-5 meeting to the summer of 1986, with evaluations of Japan's 
performance prospects and policy options in 1987-1988. 
and business pressure builds for some expansionary fiscal policy -- tax 
cuts or expenditure increases. Under these circumstances, the Japanese 
government should implement measures that minimize revenue losses and 
maximize the impact on domestic demand. In addition to the more conven-
tional and straightforward macro fiscal policy instruments of tax cuts 
and increases in expenditures, the Japanese could: 
1. Change the corporate tax system to provide more incentives for 
new investment; for example, tax reductions for incremental investment 
increases used would encourage domestic investment with only moderate 
losses of tax revenues. 
2. Implement accelerated depreciation allowances to encourage 
domestic investment; the present Japanese corporate tax system does not 
provide particularly attractive investment incentives; early indications 
suggest the proposed tax reform legislation of 1987 is not likely to 
provide direct investment incentives either. The first two measures are 
revivals of the supply-side policies " Japanese-style -- of the early 
31 1960s. 
3. Implement some encouragement for consumer loans in the persona 
taxation system, in particular, tax benefits for interest payments for 
residential construction to stimulate housing investments (the tax code 
of 1985 allows only very minor deductions (below $750 per family a year) 
for the repayment of mortgage debt)). 
In summary, in the intermediate future, fiscal policy could be 
instrumental in reducing Japan1s current-account surplus. The most 
Ryutaro Komiya, "Japan" in Foreign Tax Policies and Economic 
Growth, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1966. 
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desirable forms of fiscal expansion would not increase fiscal deficits 
excessively, even though some short-term deviation from the fiscal 
discipline of reducing budget deficits appears essential in order to 
expand domestic demand. 
Thus, the solution to the current-account problem lies not so much 
in trade policy or exchange rate policy as in fiscal policy. The quest 
for a more stable exchange regime should be carried out for its own sake 
and not primarily for the purpose of solving the imbalance in the current 
account. This evaluation applies mutatis mutandis, even more strongly to 
the United States, though of couse the desirable direction of fiscal 
policy is opposite, 
The Possibility of Future Reform of the International Monetary 
Regime 
What, then, is the scope for long-range reform of the international 
monetary regime, and what role can Japan play? We first list several 
alternative schemes for possible reforms and discuss the desirability of 
each. We then conclude by considering the feasibility of these schemes 
in the light of benefit-cost structures that they impose on the partici-
pating countries. 
The current regime. Major industrialized countries float their 
currencies; small countries typically peg their currencies to that of a 
large trading partner or to some weighted average of exchange rates of 
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major trading partners. There are no fixed, agreed on, rules for 
The major continental Western European countries peg their rates 
to each other with a small band for modest fluctuation (the snake) under 
the European Monetary Union. West Germany plays a major role because of 
the strength of its currency. 
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exchange interventions. Monetary authorities let market forces determine 
the values of their currencies in many instances, but occasionally 
intervene in exchange markets as an individual country or through joint 
actions. Sometimes these interventions have been effective in changing 
the tide of exchange rate movements. Sometimes they have not. As we 
argue above, the current system could be regarded as satisfying the 
minimum requirements for an international monetary system; in a sense, 
each country is allowed to take a reasonable max-min strategy by choosing 
its own relatively independent monetary policy, 
Return to the adjustable-peg system. The history of the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods regime reveals the problems of the adjustable-peg 
system. The adjustable nature of the system works against the creation 
of credibility for the currently fixed parity; pegging intrinsically 
makes the smooth adjustment of the balance of payments difficult. The 
development of completely free international financial markets in the 
1980s has made even easier not only the flow of capital but also the 
possibilities of speculation in foreign exchange markets whenever rates 
appear to be unrealistically pegged by governments. There is no desir-
able way to return to this old system. 
Intervention based on profit motives. Friedman states that monetary 
authorities intervening in the exchange market according to the profit 
criterion normally serve to stabilize the path of flexible exchange-rate 
movements. According to this view, governments should intervene in such 
a way as to maximize their profits from intervention. As Mayer and 
Taguchi argue, however, there are several conceptual problems as well as 
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33 difficulties of measurement with this proposition. Nonetheless, this 
approach appears worth pursuing. Some ideal intervention schemes may 
help stabilize the yen and internationalize it, possibly by a competitive 
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process. 
Coordination of monetary policies. The idea of attaining stable 
exchange rates by coordination of monetary policy among the major nations 
35 has been raised in a stimulating proposal by Ronald McKinnon, He 
maintains that the national price level correlates more with the aggre-
gate world money supply than with its national money supply. Even though 
his empirical claim is not fully convincing, it is quite natural in the 
presence of currency substitution that a nation1s price level correlates 
not only with its own money supply but also with those of other curren-
cies. McKinnon argues that by stabilizing the weighted sum of the money 
supplies of major currencies -- namely, the dollar, the mark and the yen 
-- price stability in the world economy as well as stability in exchange 
rates can be attained. He suggests, though with some reservations, that 
the stabilized exchange rate achieved under such a tripartite money 
agreement might eventually lead to a system close to the fixed 
exchange-rate system; interventions in the exchange market would elimi-
33 
Mayer and Taguchi, op. cit. 
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For the internationalization of the Yen, see Yoichi Shinkai 
"Internationalization of Finance in Japanff in this volume. For the 
competitive process of choosing an international currency, see F.A. 
Hayek, Decentralization of Money, Hobart Papers Specials, No. 70, Insti-
tute of Economic Affairs. 
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Ronald I. McKinnon, An International Standard for Monetary Stabil-
ization (Washington Institute for International Economics, 1984). 
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nate short-run volatility of exchange rates within, for example, a 2 per 
cent band of the parity. 
Since exchange rate determination, depends strongly on the money 
supply process, regardless of the system, McKinnon{s proposal reflects 
basic economic logic. Problems remain, of course: Why are three coun-
tries sufficient? How are the weights in his global monetarist formula 
to be calculated? How are real disturbances that affect the composition 
of the currency basket to be handled? And are the three governments 
willing to give up national monetary autonomy for the sake of tripartite 
monetary stability? Despite these problems, his proposal contains 
interesting elements that continue to stimulate thinking on the ideal 
monetary system for the future. 
Interventions to maintain a target zone: Based on his diagnosis of 
the reasons for the misalignment of exchange rates of major currencies, 
Williamson proposes that governments identify, in consultation with the 
IMF, the set of fundamental equilibrium exchange rates (FEER) and public-
ly declare their support for a system of crawling target zones with soft 
margins, This target exchange rate zone should be supported by 
governments though concerted interventions and a combination of suitable 
monetary policies. This kind of system would be desirable if the specif-
ic measurement of the FEER is easy. The difficulty in the real world 
under uncertainty is that diverse opinion may exist concerning the true 
value of the FEER. 
Whereas the McKinnon proposal is limited to control of the money 
supply from a monetarist point of view, Williamson takes a broader 
Williamson, op, cit., especially pp. 76-77. 
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perspective that includes fiscal as well as monetary policy. Indeed, 
much of the discussion in the mid-1980s about the possibility of 
macroeconomic coordination focuses on budget issues, in terms both of 
expenditures and of the nature of the tax system, as well as on the money 
supply. A further key question is to what degree the structural differ-
ences in the investment and savings rates of countries should be incorpo-
rated into this type of analysis of the FEER. The United States in the 
1980s can be regarded as a special case because it has pursued a policy 
based not on a structural gap between domestic savings and investment but 
on a deliberate pursut of high expenditures relative to production, made 
possible by historically high real interest rates, capital inflows, an 
overvalued dollar, and an excess of imports over exports. 
Finally, we move from the normative question of what regime is 
desirable to the positive question of what kind of regime is likely to be 
realized. As explained in our introduction, the ongoing system will most 
likely continue unless the present situation deteriorates enough to make 
any important participant willing to give up the benefits of the status 
quo. So long as the current half-managed float is rendering imperfect 
but tolerable service, a drastic change of regimes will not take place. 
From this perspective, the likelihood of a drastic reform in the 
intermediate future seems small. Among the alternative schemes listed 
above (other than the status quo), a return to the adjustable-peg system 
does not seem realistic, and intervention based on profit motives con-
tains some conceptual difficulties. Moreover, there may be political or 
psychological resistance to the idea that a government or a central bank 
should behave primarily according to profit criteria. 
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The fourth alternative, the coordination of monetary policies, is a 
provocative idea. However, achieving agreement in the proper weights for 
the currency composition of the global money basket or on the proper 
distribution of the costs of monetary expansion (or contraction) among 
the participant countries will not be easy, 
The fifth alternative, the announcement and observance of a soft 
target zone appears desirable, but realizing it would require very 
substantial international coordination and agreement. First, countries 
would have to agree on some reasonable ways of calculating the FEER. 
Then they would have to agree on the desirable degree of concerted 
actions in interventions. Even after agreement on evaluation of current 
situation and on the possible remedy is achieved, the question of which 
countries should engage in interventions will have to be negotiated. The 
major countries have a long way to go to achieve all of these. The 
Baker-Miyazawa (U.S.-Japan) agreement of October 1986, was a step toward 
a target zone system, but it is unclear how long this agreement will 
last. Exogenous shocks are inevitable, but usually difficult to predict; 
they are likely to interrupt any system of a crawling exchange-rate zone. 
In sum, the adoption of flexible exchange rates essentially ended 
the necessity of parallel movements in price levels, although there still 
exists more subtle interdependence among countries. Thus, the current 
system enables monetary authorities to enjoy a greater degree of monetary 
autonomy compared with the Bretton Woods regime. Each country has more 
freedom to choose its own price level since it is less affected by the 
policies of its major economic partners. In this sense, one may heuris-
tically state that the "max-min" solution under flexible exchange rates 
provides relatively attractive solutions to participating countries, or 
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that the noncooperative Nash equilibrium in the policy game under flexi-
ble exchange rates diverges less from cooperative outcomes, as compared 
with game solutions under the Bretton Woods regime. In the game of 
choosing or agreeing on a new exchange rate regime, it would be difficult 
to find the payoffs under a new system that exceeded those of the status 
quo solution. Accordingly, this cost-benefit structure may give the 
present system a much longer life span than many have expected. 
The dissatisfaction expressed in the mid-1980s with the current 
managed float regime does not justify a return to the old system* Even 
though participants in the present system seems to desire some degree of 
cooperation, cooperation is not crucial. Under the fixed exchange rate, 
cooperation was inevitable, but the incentive structure to realize 
cooperation was inadequate. The old system lacked coherent incentive 
compatibility, in addition to being vulnerable to speculative attacks. 
A system based on a single global currency and a single monetary 
authority might be an economic ideal. But without world government, the 
achievement of a single currency system with full public-goods benefits 
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The loss of national 
autonomy in monetary policy during the process of attaining such a system 
would be immediate and concrete, whereas the potential benefits would 
accrue only when the final stage of world currency unification was 
reached. The realization of a completely fixed exchange regime without 
the possibility and defects of rate adjustment would be even more politi-
37 
cally than technically difficult. 
37 
Hamada, The Political Economy,. Ch. 3. 
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The existence of considerable trade or current-account imbalances 
does not necessarily imply the misalignment of nominal exchange rates. 
In the year of continuing devaluation of the dollar following September 
1985, for example, Japanfs current account continued to increase substan-
tially in dollars though its growth slowed down in yen. While in part a 
short-run J-curve effect, the evidence suggests that structural mecha-
nisms related to savings and investment behavior may be embedded in the 
world economy such that certain countries accumulate considerable 
current-account surpluses or deficits. Although the United States may in 
time eliminate its deficit, we anticipate a Japanese tendency to surplus 
for the foreseeable future. 
Where will Japan stand then? Japan1s economy now occupies a sub-
stantial share of the world economy -- about one-tenth. Its trade 
structures and wage and price determination mechanisms are quite differ-
ent from those of the United States and Western Europe as well as from 
those in developing countries. It seems therefore that the optimum 
oo 
currency area for Japan is Japan itself. In addition, there seem to be 
many factors in Japan that obstruct the achievement of international 
reforms in the direction of stabler and quasi-fixed exchange rate re-
gimes. Even though some former government officials apparently feel 
nostalgic for the Bretton Woods regime, it seems quite unlikely that 
sufficient political momentum based on economic interests will come about 
to motivate Japan to pursue a drastic reform. The only likely exception 
would be if protective pressures from outside Japan become stringent. 
This catastrophic situation might make a drastic reform possible, even 
oo 
Robert A. Mundell, International Economics, Macmillan, 1968. 
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though exchange rate reform by itself will not solve balance-of-payments 
problems unless accompanied by appropriate changes in macroeconomic 
fiscal and monetary management* 
Thus, a realistic role in the monetary regime for the foreseeable 
future is for Japan to continue to be passive and to practice a managed 
float. Sometimes it will let the yen exchange rates be freely determined 
by the market; sometimes it will intervene unilaterally or multilaterally 
if the Japanese government feels the yen is misaligned. Depending on its 
ability to influence public expectations, intervention policy will or 
39 
will not be successful. In order to be realistic and not engage in 
wishful thinking, we are obliged to end this paper on this skeptical 
note, 
39 
The accumulating cases of (particularly concerted) intervention 
provide growing research opportunities to appraise the influence of 
interventions on the expectations of exchange rate market participants. 
These experiences may make it possible to construct some appropriate 
rules of intervention to enhance stability of the exchange rate system. 
Table 1 
United States and Japan, Balance-of-Payments Surplus or Deficit 
and Government Budget Deficit, 1970-1986 
(U.S. $ billions) 
Central Government 
Global Current Account U.S. Current Account Budget Deficit 
Japan U.S. Deficit with Japan % of GNP 
Amount % GNP Amount % GNP Current Account Surplus % U.S. Deficit Japan U.S. 
1970 1.97 1.0 2.331 0.2 -0.857 * -0.5 -0.3 
1971 5.797 2.5 -1.433 -0.0 -2.750 191.9 -1.5 -2.2 
1972 6.624 2.3 -5.795 -0.5 -4.782 82.5 -1.3 -2.0 
1973 
-0.136 -0.0 7.140 0.5 -1.631 * -1.6 -1.2 
1974 
-4.693 -1.0 1.962 0.1 -1.048 * -1.6 -0.4 
1975 -0.682 -0.1 18.116 1.1 -1.372 * -3.6 -3.5 
1976 3.68 0.6 4.207 0.2 -5.286 * -4.3 -4.3 
1977 10.928 1.7 -14.511 -0.7 -8.149 56.2 -5.2 -2.8 
1978 16.534 1.9 -15.427 -0.7 -11.676 75.7 -5.2 -2.7 
1979 -8.693 -0.8 -0.991 -0.0 -8.6 867.8 -6.0 -1.6 
1980 -10.746 -1.1 1.873 0.1 -9.1 * -5.9 -2.8 
1981 4.770 0.4 6.339 0.2 -14.1 * -5.0 -2.6 
1982 6.850 0.6 -8.051 -0.3 -15.8 196.2 -5.2 -4.1 
1983 20.799 1.8 -45.994 -1.4 -18.3 39.9 -4.8 -6.3 
1984 35.00 2.7 -107.358 -2.8 -37.7 35.1 -4.3 -5.0 
1985 49.169 3.7 -117.7 -2.8 -45.2 41.3 -3.9 
-5.4, 
1986 86.970 4.2 -140.6 -3.3 -55.9 39.8 -3.8a -4.8b 
Sources: Various issues of Bank of Japan, Economic Statistical Annual and Balance of Payments Monthly; Economic 
Report of the President, U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business" 
Mote: An asterisk in the sixth column indicates opposite relationship, a minus sign indicates current-account 
deficit. 
Japan-U.S. bilateral current account based on American data; Japan's surplus is equivalent to the U.S.-
deficit. 
Ministry of Finance estimate. 
Office of Management and the Budget estimate. 
Figure 1: Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate 
(Spot-Closing Rate in the Tokyo Market) 
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Figure 3: Yen - Dollar Exchange Rate 
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